but instead I was pleasantly surprised to find that 24Ϫ8 ϭ 16, and so I could collect from my fictional department chair an additional salary for having caused 4 more students to pass than in the previous year. My cohort size and my ratio measure of effect were both identical, and yet I had affected 33% more students this year than the year before.
How could the ratio effect measure-surely our most familiar analytic approach-lead one so far astray? And if it could, why is it still our favored approach? In June of 2009, the editors of EPIDEMIOLOGY convened a symposium at the annual meeting of the Society for Epidemiologic Research in Anaheim, California. The purpose was to ask why epidemiologists have come to rely almost entirely on relative measures of effect (odds ratios, risk ratios and hazard ratios), even though this practice generates considerable confusion, especially over interaction, effect modification, and the potential public health benefits associated with reported effects. Many of these problems could be avoided simply by a greater attention to the baseline risks in our research and the reporting of our results.
The 3 presentations from this symposium are provided here as commentaries. Charles Poole 1 begins with a historical quest to understand the roots of our prejudice favoring relative contrasts, and the rationale for the common wisdom that relative effect measures are more suited for etiologic hypotheses. His account highlights the unintentional adverse effects of "causal criteria," such as those popularized by BradfordHill, and represents the kind of insightful intellectual history of our field we seldom see. Bryan Langholz 2 follows with a discussion of the case-control study design, and the pervasive yet erroneous belief that this design restricts us to the oddsratio scale. As he shows, we can almost always choose to conduct studies that retain absolute risk information, yet for reasons that may range from habit to ignorance, we rarely do. Moreover, even when this information is available, we seldom use it. These failings cannot be attributed to the casecontrol design itself, only to our apparent reluctance to apply it more effectively. Finally, Miguel Hernán 3 comments on a built-in bias lurking in hazard ratios. The problem is that the hazard at a particular time is, by definition, calculated in the subset of individuals who survived through that time. Thus hazard ratios are calculated in a surviving cohort that is increasingly selected over time. One solution is a contrast of absolute survival curves -an analysis that does not refer to the relative frequency of events occurring in a surviving subset, but rather simply to cumulative proportions of the original cohort that have failed or survived at each time point.
The editors of EPIDEMIOLOGY hope these essays will spur refection and discussion. While we won't insist on one effect scale or another as a blanket policy, we encourage authors to think carefully about what design and analysis best fit their study questions and subject-matter needs. We suspect that such refection is likely to lead to much more research being situated on the absolute scale. Old habits die hard, even when they no longer serve us well (if indeed they ever did). But if we can transcend our outdated aphorisms and shed our comfortable old misunderstandings, perhaps epidemiology may be a real science after all.
